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ABSTRACT I _ .- ‘I”. 
: 
A long-term goal of the NASA Langley Research'Centet is the development of 
a reliability assessment methodology of sufficient powerto enable the credible 
comparisou of the stochastic attributes,of one ultrareliable system design 
against others. This methodology, developed over a.lOAyear period, is a' 
combined analytic and simulative technique. An analytic component is the 
Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation capability, third generation, or simply 
CARE III. A simulative component is the Gate Logic Software Simulator 
capability, or GLOSS. 
This paper focuses on the numerous factors that potentially have a 
degrading effect on system reliability and the ways in which these factors that 
are peculiar to highly reliable fault-tolerant systems are accounted for in 
credible reliability assessments. Also presented are the modeling difficulties 
that result from their inclusion and the ways in which CARE III and GLOSS 
mitigate the intractability of the heretofore unworkable mathematics. 
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RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT GOAL 
A long-term goal of the NASA Langley Research Center is the development of 
a reliahi.lFty assessment methodology of sufficient power to enable the credible 
comparison of the stochastic attributes of one ultrareliable system design 
against others (fig. ,l). This methodology, developed over a lo-year period, is 
a combined analytic and simulative technique. 
OBJECTIVE: DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO ASSESS THE RELIABILITY 
OF ANY FAULT-TOLERANT DIGITAL COMPUTER-BASED 
SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE SYSTEM EFFECTS OF SOFTWARE 
Figure 1 
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COMBINED ANALYTIC SIMULATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for performing reliability assessments is based on the 
utilization of an analytic model that accounts for the long time constants of 
hardware and/or software failures and a separate analytic model that tracks the 
short time constants of system fault-handling mechanisms. These models, which 
are embodied in computer programs, in conjunction with a simulative model, make 
possible the reliability assessment of large, practical fault-tolerant systems 
(fig. 2). 
The CARE III computer program (codeveloped by the Raytheon Company and the 
Langley Research Center (ref. 1)) provides an analytic capability. The GLOSS is 
a simulative capability that provides CARE III with stochastic fault-handling 
data. The GLOSS concept was demonstrated by application to the CPU of an 
avionic processor. A generalized GLOSS that provides a user-friendly hardware 
description language interface is currently being developed. The GLOSS was 
codeveloped by the Bendix Corporation and the Langley Research Center 
(refs. 2, 3). 
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118 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT LEADING TO CARE III 
The motivation for developing the combined analytic simulative methodology 
dates back to 1973. The long-term development of CARE 111 is depicted in 
figure 3. State-of-the-art reliability evaluators were typical of CARE, a 
computer program developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and TASRA (Tabular 
System Reliability Analysis), developed by Battelle Memorial Laboratories. The 
Raytheon Company and Langley jointly developed the CARE II, which provided a 
superset CARE model with an extensive fault-handling model. Langley was also 
involved in the development of CAST (Combined Analytic Simulative Technique), 
which provides the current Langley modeling concept. CAST was developed by the 
Ultra Systems, Inc. CARSRA (Computer-Aided Redundant System Reliability 
Analysis) was a spin-off from the Boeing ARCS (Advanced Reconfigurable Computer 
System) study. Langley has also been involved in numerous technology 
development studies, some of which are depicted in the figure. This long-term 
involvement has culminated in the development of the CARE III. 
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Figure 3 
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PROFOUND OBSERVATIONS 
On our way toward developing the specifications for CARE'III, we found that 
for ultrareliable systems certain factors that previously were of little interest 
to the reliability analyst now potentially have a significant effect (fig. 4). 
This is particularly true of systems with a flight crucial probability of failure 
of less than 10-g in a l- to lo-hour mission. An example of this observation 
is the latent (undetected) fault. We also realized that even complex assessment 
capabilities must be user-friendly; this is always a difficult task for complex 
capabilities. 
PROBLEMS: 
1. EVERYTHING IMPORTANT WHEN PF < 10-l 
2. PROGRAM VERSATILITY vs CONVENIENCE 
AND EFFICIENCY 
Figure 4 
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HIGHLY RELIABLE FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
TO WHICH CARE III IS APPLICABLE 
The class of fault-tolerant systems of most interest currently utilizes 
off-the-shelf processors or:computers (fig. ,5). These systems rely heavily on 
the ability of-the 
fault/error to the 
processors to detect system faults/errors, to identify the 
smallest reconfigurable unit, and to effect recovery. 
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COVERAGE - A MAJOR RELIABILITY DRIVER 
In ultrareliable fault-tolerant systems, the inability of a system to 
achieve perfect fault/error handling is often the dominant cause of system 
failure (fig. 6). The major contributor of diminished fault/error handling is 
the latent fault /error. The long-term (latent) accumulation of faults/errors 
poses a severe threat to the system's ability to detect and lnask out anomalies. 
The modeling of fault/error handling adds a tremendous amount of additional 
complexity to the reliability assessment task. 
THE PREDOMINANT CAUSE OF FAILURE IN ULTRARELIABLE 
DIGITAL SYSTEMS HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO 
FACTORS OTHER THAN HARDWARE SPARES DEPLETION 
COVERAGE - MEASURE OF SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO HANDLE FAULTS p=>sysT~~ 
l FAULT DETECTION 
l FAULT ISOLATION 
l RECONFIGURATION AND RECOVERY 
UNDETECTED FAULT - LATENT FAULT 
Figure 6 
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DELINEATION OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
FAILURE AND ERROR MODELS 
The increased complexity is indicated by the number of additional 
fault/error models that now must be considered. The increase in the number of 
fault/error models that rmst be accounted for is largely attributed to use of 
the digital computer (which possess extensive memory capability) and very high 
system reliability requirements. An extensive memory capability is a two-edged 
sword in that not only are computational capability and flexibility enhanced, 
but the likelihood of latent faults and errors occurring is also increased. 
Ultrareliability necessitates the consideration of design errors, which 
previously were considered to be insignificant. Each branch in the trees in 
figure 7 represents a fault/error model. Faults are hardware generated, 
whereas errors are caused by a fault or by software design anomalies. Either 
one may be permanent or may appear to be transient or intermittent. The common 
piece-parts reliability analysis is shown as a permanent random hardware 
failure. 
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FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY TREE FOR A NEAR-FUTURE PROPOSED 
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 
Ultrareliable fault-tolerant systems increase the system reliability by 
employing redundancy, which further compounds the modeling task. A typical 
proposed advanced reconfigurable flight control system would utilize triple 
voting of units for the sensors, processor memories, and actuator electronics 
(fig. 8). In this example, the number of units increased from 22 for a 
nonredundant system to 64 for the fault-tolerant architecture. 
MPX 
A/D 
+ 
Proc. & I r - 
Figure 8 
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POSSIBLE STOCHASTIC MODELING APPROACHES 
Until recently, the reliability analyst was forced to compromise the 
analysis of such large systems either by modeling sections of the problem at a 
time and/or by making simplifying assumptions to keep the size of the 
reliability model tractable (fig. 9). The difficulty in this approach is that 
it is time consuming and complex. Perhaps more important, it is prone to error 
and is often unreproducible. Reliability models for the advanced reconfigurable 
system example shown in figure 8, which would include the details previously 
discussed (fig. 7), would require on the order of millions of states in the 
Markov modeling sense. For each state, there exists an ordinary differential 
equation. Thus, a Markov model for this system would require the solution of 
millions of differential equations, a task that is expensive, if not impossible. 
--------• 0 MARKOV (CAST, ARIES, CARSRA, SURF) 
l COMBINATORIAL (CARE, CARE II) 
l KOLMOGOROV (CARE III) (REF. 4) 
Figure 9 
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ALTERNATE STOCHASTIC MODELING APPROACHES 
Aside from using the popular Markov technique, two other approaches come 
to mind. The combinational method is the traditional piece-parts technique 
(fig. 10). In applying this technique to a fault-tolerant system with a 
reasonable degree of complexity, one soon learns, as in the development of 
-CARE II, that the computational aspects become unmanageable and involve nested 
integrals four or more deep. The Kolmogorov method, in conjunction with a 
state aggregation technique, overcomes the computational difficulties of both 
the Markov and combinatorCa1 techniques. 
0 t4fmov (CAST, ARIES, CARSRA, SURF) 
____I, e COMBINATORIAL (CARE, CARE II) 
-b l KOLMOGORW (CARE III) 
Figure 10 
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THE CARE III APPROACH 
The ability of CARE III to provide extensive fault occurrence and fault- 
handling models is largely attributed to its ability to cope with large state 
spaces and is made possible by the observation that the time constants associated 
with fault occurrence are on the order of lo4 hours whereas the time constants 
of the fault-handling.model are on the order of 10 -3 hours. This wide time separa- 
ration allows the fault occurrence model to be treated as being independent of 
the fault-handling model. Thus, the fault-handling model is evaluated without 
regard to fault occurrences (fig. 11). The results of the fault-handling model 
are then combined with the fault occurrence model to produce the desired reliability 
outputs. The fault occurrence model is solved using Kolmogorov's forward differ- 
ential equations. The Kolmogorov technique is used ecause the state reduction 
process discussed above necessarily requires the solution of a nonhomogenous 
(time-dependent failure rates) Markov process. 
APPROACH o DEFINE SYSTEM STATE ONLY IN TERMS OF 
NUMBER OF EXISTING FAULTS 
o INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE TRANSITION PARAMETERS 
AS A FUNCTION OF DISTRIBUTION OF POSSIBLE 
FAULT TYPES AND STATES 
o DETERMINE RELIABILITY USING KOLMOGOROV'S 
FORWARD DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS 
TASK o NUMBER OF STATES DRASTICALLY REDUCED, 
TRANSITION RATES NECESSARILY TIME DEPENDENT 
Figure 11 
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A MIXED MARROV MODEL AND ITS STATE-REDUCED AGGREGATED 
RELIABILITY MODEL 
An ilLustration of the state reduction technique can be seen by observing 
the reliability model of a two-unit system (fig. 12(a)). States 0, 1, and F 
are the fault occurrence states. The states enclosed in the dashed lines are 
the fault-handling states. The two-unit model is a mixture of a nonhomogenous 
and a semi-Markov model, which is the type of model CARE III was designed to 
evaluate. The model that CARE III actually evaluates is the aggregated reli- 
ability model shown in Figure 12(b). The aggregated model is a nonhomogeneous 
Markov model. CARE III approximates the mixed process with a nonhomogeneous 
Markov process and can do so because of the wide separation in time constants 
in the fault occurrence and fault-handling models. In the aggregate model, 
the states are strictly fault occurrence states (defines number of failed 
units). The fault-handling model information contained in the dashed box of 
the two-unit system is mapped into the time-varying transition rate a'(t). The 
nonhomogeneous aggregated Markov model is solved using the Kolmogorov solution 
technique to produce time-varying probabilities of being in states 0, l', and 
F (the failure state) over the desired mission time. Although the state reduc- 
tion wasn't too dramatic for this simple example, in practical assessments, 
state reductions of 6 orders of magnitude have been estimated. 
t = GLOBAL OR MISSION TIME 
t' = Tlh'lE FROM ENTRY TO STATE A 
T = TIME FROM ENTRY TO STATE AE 
AGGREGATED RELIABILITY MODEL 
#ITH I = 2.~. LI (t) = A 
(a) (b) 
Figure 12 
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CARE III FAULT-HANDLING MODEL 
.The ability of CARE III to model the fault/error models delineated in 
figure 7 is made possible by CARE III's single- and double-fault models through 
the judicious selection of the appropriate transition rates and/or state 
holding probability density functions. The double fault model accounts for 
critically coupled coexisti.ng failures, which are user defined. The critically 
coupled failures, when they exist, are defined by certain combinations of pairs 
of states in the single-fault model (e.g., failure of two critically coupled 
units each in state A will cause system failure). The structure of the 
single-fault model can be grasped by referring to figure 13, the reliability 
model of a two-unit system. 
Initially, the system is in state 0 and has experienced no failures. 
When a failure occurs, the system enters state A, the active latent state. 
This arrival is governed by the arrival density x(t >= Depending upon the 
nature of the failure (i.e., permanent, transient, intermittent, etc.), the 
fault-handling model will be defined differently. For example, if the failure 
is intermittent, x(t) would be the probability density function (pdf) for the 
arrival of an intermittent, and states A and B define the intermittent 
model where c1 and f3 are constant transition rates into and out of state B. 
When the system is in state B, the benign state, the failed unit appears to 
have healed itself, that is, the manifestation of the failure, a fault, 
vanishes. However, when the failed manifestation is once again resumed (the 
fault reappears), the system enters state A, where the failure looks like a 
permanent failure. It could be detected by a self-test program with pdf 
6(t'), and the system would enter state AD, the active detected state. If a 
spare exists, the system will purge the faulty unit and switch in the spare 
(dashed arc to state 1). Alternatively, while in the active state, the fault 
could generate errors with pdf dt ' >. 
active error state. 
The system then will enter AE, the 
The intermittent failure could manifest its intermittent 
state again, and the system would then enter state B 
iGi' 
the benign error state. 
Although the failure is benign, the error may not be enign and may cause 
system failure which is denoted by the BE to F transition (1-c)~(-r). 
The error detection density is E(T), and 1-C is the proportion of errors 
from which the system is unable to recover. 
could be detected and corrected. 
While in state BE, the error 
In this event, the system enters state 
(benign detected) by transition CE(T>. At this point, 
BD 
the system may choose 
to do nothing further with the detected and corrected error and so move to the 
benign state, or the system may choose to reconfigure out the module containing 
the error and therefore move to state 1. The dashed arcs are instantaneous 
transitions. The other transition out of state is to state F, the 
single-point failure transition (l-c)E(T). This % transition is similar to the 
kou',"d b: n~~~%:~? 
In a well-designed fault-tolerant system, (l-c)&(~) 
If x(t) is the pdf for the arrival of a transient, a 
would be set to a value greater than zero and B would be equal to zero. The 
pdf x(t) for the arrival of a permanent failure would be defined so that a = H 
= 0. The dashed arc going from state AD to A enables the analyst to 
include the effects of the system decision that the detected fault which took 
the system from state A to AD was, in fact, a transient. In this regard, 
the system would not reconfigure out a nonfailed module. 
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The reader will note that the reliability model has three measures of time 
associated with it, which necessarily makes the model a semi-Markov process. 
This added complexity is required because the behavior of the system is 
dependent on the onset of the various fault-behavior events. The availability 
of data for the fault-handling models is unfortunately still poor at best and 
is often nonexistent altogether. The creation of the data is the subject of a 
considerable amount of current research. The GLOSS capability alluded to in 
figure 2 was used to estimate 6(t') and E(T) for permanent faults in the CPU 
of an avionic miniprocessor. (See fig. 13.) 
Although the literature has often reported that transient faults are by 
far the most frequently occurring anomaly, virtually no test data exist that 
can be used for modeling transient occurrences or transient fault handling. 
Test data for intermittent faults are also sparse (ref. 5). 
In view of the extreme sensitivity that reliability assessments of 
ultrareliable systems show to best-guess transient and intermittent failure 
occurrence data, one can only wonder why such data are not abundant. 
t = GLOBAL OR MISSION TIME 
t’ = TIME FROM ENTRY TO STATE A 
T = TIME FROM ENTRY TO STATE AE 
Figure 13 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The reliability assessment of ultrareliable fault-tolerant systems adds 
new dimensions of complexity to the assessment methodology (fig. 14). New 
tools are emerging to assist the reliability analyst to cope with the 
additional modeling complexities. 
The availability of data for these novel tools is, however, slow in coming 
and will no doubt stunt the progress of developing ultrareliable fault-tolerant 
systems. 
l NOVEL POWERFUL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
ARE EMERGING: CARE III AND GLOSS 
a AVAILABILITY OF DATA IS SPARSE 
l LACK OF SUFFICIENT DATA WILL STUNT THE 
GROWTH OF ULTRARELIABLE DIGITAL SYSTEMS 
Figure 14 
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